Comments - This essay was awarded 23/25 IB points.
To what extent did George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram shape American foreign policy during the Cold War?
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Higher Level History
[IB NUMBER]
[SCHOOL]
Higher Level History
Word Count: 2000
Part A: Plan of the Investigation (133)
The purpose of this investigation is to establish the extent to which George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram played a role in shaping American foreign policy during the Cold War. It will examine the antagonization of Soviet Russia in the Department of the State, developments in foreign policy-making, and the extension of these policies from 1946-1947. This investigation will be conducted through the use of primary and secondary sources, and two sources to be evaluated include John Lewis Gaddis’ The United States and the Origins of the Cold War and George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram.
The Long Telegram provided the conceptual framework for American foreign policy during the Cold War. Furthermore, it prompted for a policy of containment towards the USSR. The Long Telegram laid the foundation for anti-Soviet policy in the United States.
Part B: Summary of Evidence (492)
Prior to the publication of the Long Telegram, Secretary of State James Byrnes described a position of “patience with firmness” in American foreign policy.[1] Recent developments with the USSR included Josef Stalin’s speech to Moscow on February 9, which outlined the incompatibility of capitalism and communism; and conflict regarding Soviet aggression in Iran resulting from a defiance of the March 2 deadline for the withdrawal of military occupation in Azerbaijan.[2] The dispatch of the Telegram on February 22 1946 coupled with American-Soviet conflict allowed for the shift away from Byrne’s described policy.[3]
On February 20 1947, the American government was informed that aid to Greece and Turkey could no longer be provided by the British Treasury.[4] Britain was providing aid to help suppress Kremlin-instigated insurgency in Greece and resist Soviet pressures for border realignment in Turkey.[5] On February 27, President Harry Truman, Secretary of State George Marshall, and Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson addressed Congress to the importance of continued assistance to Greece and Turkey.[6] Acheson led the demonstration by describing a “polarization of power” and the need “for the United States to take steps to strengthen countries threatened with Soviet aggression or communist subversion”.[7]
Resonance by the cautionary in the Telegram was demonstrated among a number of key members in the State Department and containment was integrated into all further
policy-making.[8] After prompting by Acheson, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee developed a constituency for aid programs to Europe in 1947 and established a team to conduct studies of areas in need of aid.[9] The SWNCC along with the Policy Planning Staff reported that “co-ordination of economic policy in [Soviet] occupied areas, particularly Germany and Japan, with general objectives in Europe and the Far East” was of key interest to America.[10] Programs to stimulate European production of coal were also proposed,[11] to which Kennan added that “the improvement of economic conditions and revival of productive capacity in the west of Germany be given top priority”.[12]
policy-making.[8] After prompting by Acheson, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee developed a constituency for aid programs to Europe in 1947 and established a team to conduct studies of areas in need of aid.[9] The SWNCC along with the Policy Planning Staff reported that “co-ordination of economic policy in [Soviet] occupied areas, particularly Germany and Japan, with general objectives in Europe and the Far East” was of key interest to America.[10] Programs to stimulate European production of coal were also proposed,[11] to which Kennan added that “the improvement of economic conditions and revival of productive capacity in the west of Germany be given top priority”.[12]
On March 12 1947, the Truman Doctrine was presented as the formulation of America’s response to the Greek-Turkish situation.[13] Truman declared the initiative as a moral struggle between two ways of living –“one way of life is based upon the will of the majority ...the second ...based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority.” [14] After Truman’s announcement of American intentions to support “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures,” Congress allocated $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey.[15]
Containment was extended with the Marshall Plan on June 5 1947.[16] It was a program for European economic revival, and General Marshall assured that “any government willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation by the United States”.[17] It was accepted by many nations, extending its impact to 270 000 000 people.[18] When the Eastern Bloc nations of Poland and Czechoslovakia attempted to claim Marshall aid, Stalin intervened with political and financial pressure to prevent this.[19]
Part C: Evaluation of Sources (566)
The first source to be evaluated is John Lewis Gaddis’ The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, published in 1972. Gaddis, the Professor Military and Naval History at Yale University, provides in his book an analysis on the steps leading to the Cold War for an academic audience. His preface states that “if there is a single theme which runs through this book, it is the narrow range of alternatives open to American leaders during this period”.[20] Therefore, Gaddis asserts in his thesis that conflicting attempts at peace by the United States and the Soviets led to the Cold War.[21]
Gaddis is effective in his portrayal of the events from the period as they appeared to the policy-makers of the time. He states in his preface that “I have not hesitated to express judgements critical of American policy-makers, but in doing so have tried to keep in mind the constraints, both external and internal, which limited their options”.[22] Gaddis’ consideration of various influencing factors provides the reader with a number of perspectives for a single event, and thus a better understanding of situations.
Gaddis provides an extensive collection of sources in the bibliography of this book. It encompasses works from notable historians and the archives of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, government records such as the State Department’s Documents on American Foreign Relations, and other such credible sources.
A limitation of this book presented by Timothy J. White is that “by focusing on the role of personality, misperception, and bureaucratic decision-making, Gaddis failed to emphasize the fundamentally diverging interests of the Soviets and Americans after the war.”[23] White asserts that Gaddis’ presentation of facts inaccurately imply to a reader that improved diplomacy may have prevented the Cold War.[24]
George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram, the second source to be evaluated, was sent to Washington from Moscow on February 22 1946. Since its dispatch, Kennan elevated in power in the State Department and was named “the father of containment”.[25] The Telegram was sent for the purpose of providing an answer to the Soviet problem to a specific audience -President Truman and the State Department. His thesis states that “the USSR still lives in antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’ with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence”.[26]
The Long Telegram is a primary document of vital importance to the Cold War, and its usefulness as a source rests in its effect on policy-making in the period. Though detailed justification to this assertion is provided in the body of the investigation, another example would be the impression it left on Navy Secretary James Forrestal. Forrestal made the Telegram a required reading among high-ranking officials in the Naval War College in Washington.[27]
Kennan clearly outlines the intellectual motivation for adopting containment
in American foreign policy. He gives insight to abstract concepts to ensure the readers’ understanding of the doctrine. This is seen in his analysis that Soviet views on global affairs are “not based on any analysis of situation beyond Russia’s borders ...it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war”.[28]
in American foreign policy. He gives insight to abstract concepts to ensure the readers’ understanding of the doctrine. This is seen in his analysis that Soviet views on global affairs are “not based on any analysis of situation beyond Russia’s borders ...it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war”.[28]
Wilson D. Miscamble writes that Kennan was “more of an analyst and theoretician than his fellow diplomats”. [29] Kennan therefore provides a lack of factual support or context beyond assertions such as “at bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is ...instinctive Russian sense of insecurity”.[30]
Part D: Analysis (716)
By 1946, Soviet aggression became apparent. Secretary Byrnes believed he had secured Soviet agreements for self-determination and revival of the world economy with his recent activity in foreign conferences, but Soviet conduct suggested nothing of this.[31] Stalin’s speech dispelled notions of peaceful coexistence between communism and capitalism in the post-war world, for the Soviets had readopted tactics of promoting worldwide revolution and the ideological expansion of communism. At the same time, Soviets attempted to assume spheres of influence over areas such as Iran. Kennan asserted in the Telegram that the root of Soviet conduct lay deep within the foundation of the Soviet system, and no concessions from the outside world, including the United States, could effectively resolve conflicts with Russia.[32] The publication of the Telegram reinforced that appeasement of Stalin was futile, and that the Soviets would have to be approached from a position of strength. From this, containment would become policy.
With the end of British economic aid to Greece and Turkey, Truman and his administration agreed that assistance should be provided to these nations.[33] They feared that the Marxist insurgency would overtake Athens as it had in the Balkans if aid was not forthcoming.[34] Also, if the USSR recovered from its post-war condition, its militarization would cause a subdued Greek government to forfeit its mainland for the creation of a Soviet military base.[35] A collapse of Greece would disparage morale of the neighbouring non-Marxist nation, Turkey. The fall of Turkey and Greece would be felt throughout Europe and the Middle East, specifically in Iran, Iraq, and Palestine, and communism would assume a domino effect over the area.[36] America intervention in the affairs of nations beyond inter-American borders was unprecedented during times of peace. The policy of containment outlined in the Long Telegram allowed for an appropriate means of initiating peacetime intervention.
Since the economic fall of Britain, a vacuum of power was left behind in Europe.[37] Acheson related to Congress the fear that Stalin would assume position over this vacuum if a stronger force did not intervene for the containment of communist expansion. Assistance to Greece and Turkey would mark America’s acceptance of the historic British responsibility of protecting Europe from Soviet aggression.[38]
Reports by the SWNCC and PPS reinforced the idea that communism thrived in areas of instability and despair, and thus initiatives were directed towards programs of economic relief. Kennan outlined in the Telegram that Soviet intentions included the “exploiting of …conflicts between capitalist powers,” therefore economic restoration was integral to the unification of
non-Marxists states.[39] Urgency was put to areas under direct Soviet influence and particularly to Germany, since German coal mines offered promise for the industrialization and economic revival of the area.
non-Marxists states.[39] Urgency was put to areas under direct Soviet influence and particularly to Germany, since German coal mines offered promise for the industrialization and economic revival of the area.
The Truman Doctrine defined American intentions to provide political, economic, and military support for the defence of anti-Communist governments under a firm policy of containment.[40] In his speech, Truman assumed the traditional American integration of principle with cause, and adopted the message behind Kennan’s Telegram to present the Greek-Turkish situation as a struggle between democracy and despotism.[41] This solidified American commitment to communist suppression by morally tying America to the issue, and therefore left Stalin no room for reciprocal concessions with the United States.
The Marshall Plan committed the United States to the task of alleviating the social and economic instability that bred communism for all areas that were in need of aid. Kennan stated that “it should be a cardinal point of our policy to see to it that elements of independent power are developed on the Eurasian land mass as rapidly as possible to create a multi-polar international order.”[42] The Marshall Plan effectively divided Europe between East, under the Soviet Union, and West, under the leadership of the United States, while unifying
anti-communist governments and raising morale of the public.[43] This allowed for the rejection of authoritarian influences and the successful containment of communism. The Plan intended to cut links between the Soviets and its satellite states by elevating them towards economic independence.[44] This would deprive the USSR of manpower, natural resources, and ability in agricultural and industrial production. The Marshall Plan was also successful in demonstrating Soviets aggression; Stalin’s rejection to American offers of aid directed much of the blame for the partition of Europe towards the USSR.[45] Containment was effective in the Marshall Plan.
anti-communist governments and raising morale of the public.[43] This allowed for the rejection of authoritarian influences and the successful containment of communism. The Plan intended to cut links between the Soviets and its satellite states by elevating them towards economic independence.[44] This would deprive the USSR of manpower, natural resources, and ability in agricultural and industrial production. The Marshall Plan was also successful in demonstrating Soviets aggression; Stalin’s rejection to American offers of aid directed much of the blame for the partition of Europe towards the USSR.[45] Containment was effective in the Marshall Plan.
Part E: Conclusion (93)
The extent to which Kennan’s Long Telegram shaped foreign policy was demonstrated by its provision of intellectual justification for a program of containment, and extended with the accommodation of this program in the American government. The Long Telegram played an integral role in transforming American foreign policy during the Cold War. For these reasons, the Long Telegram acted as the blueprint for American conduct –with Kennan its architect, in a generation of global affairs. In the words of Woodrow Wilson, “the world must be made safe for democracy”.[46] Kennan’s containment provided this security.
Part F: Bibliography
Ambrose, Stephen E. Rise to Globalism. New York: Penguin Books, 1997.
Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972.
Columbia University Press, 1972.
Kissinger, Henry. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 73, “Reflections on Containment”. New York: Council
on Foreign Relations, 1994.
on Foreign Relations, 1994.
Mayers, David. George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988.
University Press, 1988.
Miscamble, Wilson D. George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy. 1947
1950. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
1950. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development. The Marshall Plan: lessons learned
for the 21st century. France: OECD Publishing, 2008.
for the 21st century. France: OECD Publishing, 2008.
Perlmutter, Amos. Making the World Safe for Democracy: A century of Wilsonianism. New
York: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
York: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
“The Long Telegram”. In GWU Library Database [electronic university database]. 22 February
1946- [cited 29 November 2009]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/ universitylibraries.
1946- [cited 29 November 2009]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/ universitylibraries.
Travis, Frederick F. George F. Kennan and the American-Russian Relationship: 1865-1942.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1990.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1990.
White, Timothy J. “Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies”
International Social Science Review. Michigan: The Gale Group, 2000.
International Social Science Review. Michigan: The Gale Group, 2000.
[1] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 284.
[2] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 310.
[3] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 114.
[4] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 83.
[5] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 135.
[6] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 117.
[7] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 117.
[8] Frederick F. Travis, George F. Kennan and the American-Russian Relationship: 1865-1942. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1990). 18.
[9] Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 46.
[10] Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 46.
[11] Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 46.
[12] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 89.
[13] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 79.
[14] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 118.
[15] Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 46.
[16] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 119.
[17] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 119.
[18] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 92.
[19] Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development, The Marshall Plan: lessons learned for the 21st century. (France: OECD Publishing, 2008). 47.
[20] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). vii.
[21] Timothy J. White. “Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies” International Social Science Review. (Michigan: The Gale Group, 2000). 35.
[22] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). vii.
[23] Timothy J. White. “Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies” International Social Science Review. (Michigan: The Gale Group, 2000). 35.
[24] Timothy J. White. “Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies” International Social Science Review. (Michigan: The Gale Group, 2000). 35.
[25] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 85.
[26] “The Long Telegram,” In GWU Library Database [electronic university library database] 22 February 1946- [cited 29 November 2009]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/universitylibraries
[27] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 298.
[28] “The Long Telegram” In GWU Library Database [electronic university library database] 22 February 1946- [cited 29 November 2009]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/universitylibraries
[29] Wilson D. Miscamble, Kennan Through His Texts. (Cambridge University Press, 1990). 305.
[30] “The Long Telegram” In GWU Library Database [electronic university library database] 22 February 1946- [cited 29 November 2009]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/universitylibraries
[31] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 283.
[32] “The Long Telegram,” In GWU Library Database [electronic university library database] 22 February 1946- [cited 29 November 2009]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/universitylibraries
[33] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 117.
[34] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 135.
[35] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 135.
[36] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 135.
[37] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 298.
[38] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 116.
[39] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 89.
[40] Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 86.
[41] Henry Kissinger. Reflections on Containment, Vol. 73. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 117.
[42] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 132.
[43] Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development, The Marshall Plan: lessons learned for the 21st century. (France: OECD Publishing, 2008). 47.
[44] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 132.
[45] David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the dilemmas of US foreign policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 132.
[46] Amos Perlmutter, Making the World Safe for Democracy: A century of Wilsonianism. (New York: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 19.
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