Example Essay - To what extent were Soviet policies responsible for the outbreak and development of the Cold War between 1945 and 1949?

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Origins of the Cold War Essay

To what extent were Soviet policies responsible for the outbreak and development of the Cold War between 1945 and 1949?

 In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville alluded to inevitable conflict between the US and the USSR when he stated that “they alone are proceeding …along a path to which no limit can be perceived”.[1] This conflict took shape as a result of Soviet policy between 1945-9. The USSR defied agreements made over Poland and subsequently expanded Soviet influence over the area. Furthermore, its aggressive policies during the Czechoslovakian Coup of 1948 fuelled tensions between America. Aggressive Soviet foreign policy defied Western goals of self-determination outlined in the ‘Declaration for Liberated Europe’, and this led to the outbreak and development of the Cold War.

            Tensions between the US and the Soviet Union were rooted in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The USSR emerged as the first Communist state in the world, and ideological differences with the West saw the shaping of a strained and hostile relationship in the period until the end of World War II. The fate of the post-war world was the main question resulting from the end of the war, and this was uncertain because the balance of power in the world became polarized. The US and the USSR emerged powerful at the end of the war, however conflict between them resulted from the hostile policies of one nation—this hostility came from the USSR.

The USSR did not honour the self-determination of post-war Poland which was agreed to at Yalta, and this lead to the development of the Cold War. At Yalta, Stalin insisted that the Soviets gain territory through the post-war borders of Poland and as a result the Curzon Line was created.[2] This defied the borders established after the Russo-Polish War of 1921, which angered the Polish people because what was rightfully theirs was forced from them by the Soviets.[3] Western leaders interpreted Stalin’s actions as territorial expansion for the spreading of ideology rather than for security, and this contributed to an increase in suspicion from the West.[4] Furthermore, Stalin instigated disputes over free elections in the post-war Polish government by supporting a Communist-dominated Lubin Committee.[5] This developed into a key area of disagreement between the British and the Soviets, and eventually with the US as well after Truman took power, increasing tensions further between East and West. Stalin rejected the re-establishment of the original Peasant Party, demonstrating that a puppet regime would be inevitable in Poland. The ‘free-elections’ that Stalin ensured after World War II did not occur until January 19, 1947—nearly two years after the end of the war.[6] Stalin’s lack of compliance through the delay showed that the Soviets did not value the promises made at Yalta, demonstrating to the Western leaders that the USSR. Furthermore, elections occurred after a campaign of terror and intimidation; for example, from January 4 to February 3, the ten officers from the Home Army were put on trial, and their sentences ranged from several years in prison to capital punishment.[7] They were persecuted publicly because they were the leaders of the Freedom and Independence (WiN) organization. Their organization undermined the success of the Soviet-backed Lubin Committee for the upcoming elections, and their trails served as an example to the rest of the public. Krystyna Kersten argues in The establishment of Communist rule in Poland, 1943-1949 (1991) that Soviet policy in Poland was strategic in ensuring a Communist government would win the 1947 elections. She states that “the Communists were not interested in the repatriation of the army ...they wanted to avoid this, particularly before the elections.” Kersten explains that Soviet intervention in Poland made sure to undermine the ‘free’ elections with any means possible so that the Lublins would dominate Polish politics. Free elections, as promised during Yalta, were not honoured and this defiance challenged the US and resulted in the Cold War.  Furthermore, 246 candidates of the Peasant Party were disqualified prior to the election date.[8] The Soviets manipulated the circumstances and eliminated all opposition—arresting 149 and murdering 18—in order to ensure Communist leadership in Poland and strengthen the influence of Moscow in the nation.[9]  Desmond Donnelly argues in Struggle for the World (1968) that the Soviet’s use of terror in Poland ensured a Communist takeover. He states that “in these appalling circumstances of intimidation, it was not surprising the Beirut’s Communists secured complete control in Poland.”  This use of aggression was in complete defiance of the Declaration of Liberated Europe; therefore it was inevitable that a conflict with the West would erupt from the Soviets’ actions.

            Aggressive Soviet policies in the Czechoslovakian Coup of 1948 further escalated tensions between the US and the USSR and led to the outbreak of the Cold War. Stalin placed pressure on Czech officials one they showed interest in receiving Marshall Aid.[10] Since the West was sympathetic to Czechoslovakia because of their abandonment by the Munich Agreement of 1938, Stalin feared that Czechoslovakia was aligning with the West and undermined his attempts to consolidate Soviet control over Eastern Europe. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. argues in Origins of the Cold War (1967) that territorial expansion was a vital aspect of Soviet policy. He states that “the existence of any non-Communist state was by definition a threat to the Soviet Union.” As a result, the USSR was compelled to bring these states under Soviet control and these actions inevitably led to the outbreak of the Cold War. Stalin ultimately employed aggression and violence in Czechoslovakia: the Czech Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk was found dead and twelve non-Communist government officials were forced to resign.[11] The Soviet’s use of force verified the warnings of the Iron Curtain speech and justified the use of containment outline in the Long Telegram, thereby fuelling the development of the Cold War. Truman labelled the incident a “coup” that “sent shock waves throughout the civilized world.” Truman used the Soviet example of violence to extend its influence as the grounds for financing the Marshall Plan. This demonstrated that Soviet aggression provoked America into action, where she would not have acted otherwise. This view is opposed by the historian Robert S. Whitcomb, who argues in The Cold War in Retrospect: The Formative Years (1998) that the Cold War resulted from a misinterpretation of Soviet actions by the US. He states that “in America's case… [she] mistook Stalin's determination to ensure Russian security through spheres of influence as an unfortunate renewed emphasis on power politics.” Since the US did not understand the fundamental Soviet need for a buffer zone to protect itself, she retaliated against her—initially by financial methods, in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan—and made her need for security even more urgent. Therefore the US policy is at fault. However, John Lewis Gaddis refutes this claim in We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War (1998), where he argues that Stalin’s antagonistic view of the world and aggression in foreign policy ensured that a Cold War would occur. He states that “as long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union, a Cold War was unavoidable.” Gaddis places the blame on Stalin’s contribution to the origins of the Cold War because Stalin’s coupled with the Soviet authoritarian government drew the West into an escalation of hostility and a protracted arms race, and not the other way around.

            The Soviets did not respect self-determination as it was outlined in the Declaration of Liberated Europe, and this led to the outbreak of the Cold War. The Soviets defied the Declaration by forcing a Communist government in Poland. Furthermore, the USSR acted as aggressors through its involvement in the Czechoslovakian Coup by supporting the Soviet takeover. Soviet conduct between 1945-7 justified Kennan’s claim that “the USSR still lives in antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’ with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence”.[12]

Bibliography

Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Kersten, Krystyna. The establishment of Communist rule in Poland, 1943-1949. San Francisco:
            University of California Press, 1991.

“Long Telegram”. In GWU Library Database  [electronic university database]. 22 February
            1946- [cited 11 February 2011]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/
            universitylibraries.

Rogers, Keely. The Cold War. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2008.


Schlesinger Jr., Arthur M. Origins of the Cold War. Foreign Affairs, 1967.

Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1945..

Whitcomb, Roger S. The Cold War in Retrospect: The Formative Years. Connecticut: Praeger, 1998.

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[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1945). 170.

[2] Krystyna Kersten, The establishment of Communist rule in Poland, 1943-1949. (San Francisco: University of California Press, 1991.) 332.

[3] Keely Rogers, The Cold War. (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2008). 11.

[4] Roger S. Whitcomb, The Cold War in Retrospect: The Formative Years. (Connecticut: Praeger, 1998). 203.

[5] Keely Rogers, The Cold War. (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2008). 14.

[6] Keely Rogers, The Cold War. (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2008). 18.

[7] Krystyna Kersten, The establishment of Communist rule in Poland, 1943-1949. (San Francisco: University of California Press, 1991.) 334.

[8] Keely Rogers, The Cold War. (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2008). 18.

[9] Keely Rogers, The Cold War. (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2008). 19.

[10] Keely Rogers, The Cold War. (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2008). 30.

[11] Keely Rogers, The Cold War. (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2008). 30.

[12] The Long Telegram” In GWU Library Database [electronic university library database] 22 February 1946- [cited 29 November 2009]. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/universitylibraries.